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Those in 20th century philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience who have discussed the
nature of skilled action have, for the most part, accepted the view that being skilled at an
activity is independent of knowing facts about that activity, i.e., that skill is independent
of knowledge of facts. In this paper we question this view of motor skill. We begin by
situating the notion of skill in historical and philosophical context. We use the discussion
to explain and motivate the view that motor skill depends upon knowledge of facts. This
conclusion seemingly contradicts well-known results in cognitive science. It is natural, on
the face of it, to take the case of H.M., the seminal case in cognitive neuroscience that
led to the discovery of different memory systems, as providing powerful evidence for
the independence of knowledge and skill acquisition. After all, H.M. seems to show that
motor learning is retained even when previous knowledge about the activity has been lost.
Improvements in skill generally require increased precision of selected actions, which we
call motor acuity. Motor acuity may indeed not require propositional knowledge and has
direct parallels with perceptual acuity. We argue, however, that reflection on the specifics
of H.M.’s case, as well as other research on the nature of skill, indicates that learning to
become skilled at a motor task, for example tennis, depends also on knowledge-based
selection of the right actions. Thus skilled activity requires both acuity and knowledge,
with both increasing with practice. The moral of our discussion ranges beyond debates
about motor skill; we argue that it undermines any attempt to draw a distinction between
practical and theoretical activities. While we will reject the independence of skill and
knowledge, our discussion leaves open several different possible relations between
knowledge and skill. Deciding between them is a task to be resolved by future research.
Keywords: motor skill, philosophy, HM, skill, knowledge
INTRODUCTION
In Plato’sGorgias, Socrates draws a distinction between a habitude
and an art (or craft, or skill). One mark of that distinction is that
someone has mastery of an art in virtue of explicit knowledge of
its first principles; otherwise it is merely a habit or tendency. As
Plato writes (Plato, 1998):
I say it is not an art, but a habitude, since it has no account to give
of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the
cause of any of them (465a).
On the view Socrates espouses in the Gorgias, someone with
merely a reliable tendency, even an extremely reliable tendency, to
obtain the desired results in a certain activity is not a true practi-
tioner of that art. To be an expert, one needs to obtain the desired
results in virtue of knowledge of the first principles of that activ-
ity. In fact, Socrates’s position is even stronger than this: he seems
to require a true practitioner of an art to be able to explain (“give
an account”) of these principles.
Socrates’s view in the Gorgias that expertise is constituted by
explicit knowledge of first principles has not been treated kindly
in the 20th century. In modern discussions of skill, it is the stan-
dard stalking horse. Even the less drastic view that skilled behavior
is behavior guided by knowledge of an activity that starts out as
explicit but eventually becomes implicit, is largely in disrepute.
Both in cognitive neuroscience and much of philosophy, skills
are thought not to involve knowledge of rules, but to belong in
another category entirely.
The terms used to distinguish between practical and theoreti-
cal capacities, as will become clear below, are themselves disputed.
Following standard nomenclature, we will (provisionally, and
solely for the purposes of this paper) call a process “implicit” if
learning proceeds without intention or awareness even if initiat-
ing, continuing, and practicing an action are intentional. Three
thousand years of philosophy have not yielded a successful def-
inition of knowledge. But knowledge is, minimally, a state with
propositional content, one that is suitable for use in guiding
action. As we will argue, whether or not the propositional con-
tent of a state can be verbalized (a test often used to distinguish
between explicit and implicit knowledge) is irrelevant to its status
as knowledge.
Gilbert Ryle’s target in Chapter 2 of his immensely influen-
tial 1949 book The Concept of Mind is the view that “the primary
exercise of minds consists in finding the answers to questions and
that their other occupations are merely applications of considered
truths” (Ryle, 1949). Ryle argued that skilled action was not
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merely the application of knowledge, whether explicit or implicit,
but rather the manifestation of a non-propositional state that
he labeled knowledge how. Ryle did not go as far as to deny
that most skills required some knowledge in the classical sense;
his position on such matters is unclear. However, subsequent
philosophers have.
The philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty appears to deny the
view that skilled behavior manifested cognitive states (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962). Subsequently, Pierre Bourdieu uses Merleau-
Ponty’s work to argue that social practices, which are in effect
networks of social skills, are habits in Plato’s sense, and there-
fore independent of cognitive states. In recent years, Hubert
Dreyfus has been the most influential and explicit of the anti-
cognitivists. Summing up the anti-cognitivist position, Dreyfus
writes (Dreyfus, 2005):
While infants acquire skills by imitation and trial and error, in our
formal instruction we start with rules. The rules, however, seem
to give way to more flexible responses as we become skilled. We
should therefore be suspicious of the cognitivist assumption that,
as we become experts, our rules become unconscious. Indeed, our
experience suggests that rules are like training wheels. We may
need such aids when learning to ride a bicycle, but we must even-
tually set them aside if we are to become skilled cyclists. To assume
that the rules we once consciously followedbecome unconscious is
like assuming that, whenwe finally learn to ride a bike, the training
wheels that were required for us to be able to ride in the first place
must have become invisible. The actual phenomenon suggests that
to become experts wemust switch fromdetached rule-following to
a more involved and situation-specific way of coping.
Indeed, if learners feel that they can act only if they have rea-
sons to guide them, this attitude will stunt their skill acquisition.
It is clear even from the very vocabulary of anti-cognitivists from
Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu (the “habitus”) through to Dreyfus
that the pre-dominant 20th century tendency in philosophical
and social scientific studies of skill is to reject Socrates’s distinc-
tion between habitude and art. As Carlotta Pavese reminds us
(Pavese, Unpublished), Ryle, ever knowledgeable about the tra-
dition on the matter, went out of us way to distinguish between
habits and skills (Ryle, 1949). It is not however completely clear
if Ryle’s positive view of the mental allows for the distinction the
need for which he himself emphasizes. Knowledge of facts about
the activity hinders expertise. It is hard to avoid the suspicion
that the standard contemporary view it is only mere habitude in
Socrates’s sense that is genuine expertise. As Dreyfus and Dreyfus
write (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1984):
The expert is simply not following any rules! He is doing just what
Socrates . . . feared he might be doing – discriminating thousands
of special cases.
It is quite natural to read much of the literature on the cogni-
tive psychology and neuroscience of skill as mirroring much of
the philosophical literature’s repudiation of the view that skilled
motor behavior is the application of knowledge. For example,
there is evidence that active reflection on the principles of an
activity impedes performance (Beilock et al., 2002). One could
take this as further evidence for the non-cognitivist position.
After all, if skilled behavior is guided by knowledge of facts about
the activity, then it would seem that performance requires active
reflection on such knowledge. But if “online attentional moni-
toring of step by step performance” hinders expert performance
(Ibid.), then perhaps experts are not following rules at all.
The cognitive neuroscience literature seems to provide strong
support for the view that at least retention of knowledge of facts
about an activity is not required in order to be skilled at that
activity. One of the central cases in cognitive neuroscience is
the famous case of HM. According to the standard theoretical
description of HM’s deficit, he lost the capacity to retain knowl-
edge of facts that he learned after the operation that caused his
amnesia. However, he was supposedly able to acquire new proce-
dural knowledge, and retain it (and even improve upon it) over
time (Milner, 1962). Cognitive neuroscience often identifies pro-
cedural knowledge with the functional category of motor skill.
The core idea that cognitive neuroscientists take from HM is that
motor skills can be retained, even when knowledge about the
activity fails to be retained. As a result, the standard view in cog-
nitive neuroscience is that being skilled at an activity does not
require knowledge of facts about that activity (Cohen and Squire,
1980).
Procedural knowledge is standardly opposed to declarative
knowledge. Note that use of the word “knowledge” after pro-
cedural already introduces a contradiction. What is non-factual
knowledge of an action? It is also rare to find any kind of clear
characterization of declarative knowledge. But it is something
like knowledge that can be verbally articulated. Another standard
assumption is that declarative knowledge is knowledge in the
“folk” sense of knowledge of facts, as well as the corresponding
sense of knowledge relevant to traditional philosophical debates.
The predominant tendency in the literature on motor skill is to
seek to minimize cognitive aspects of its acquisition and improve-
ment. It is commonplace to argue that explicit cognition is at best
modulating or at worst contaminating motor learning. As a result,
in some textbooks of cognitive neuroscience, motor skill is not
included in the table of contents.
The consequences of this are significant. Sports are widely con-
sidered a motor activity and are often contrasted with intellectual
or theoretical activities. This divide is apparent in the notion of
the “dumb jock” and contentious debates about the role of sport
on college campuses. Our main contention in this article is that
this dichotomy has in part been driven by a misunderstanding
of the scientific findings, exemplified by the case of HM. We will
argue that this results from two overly hasty and ultimately incor-
rect identifications between categories in neuroscience and mental
kinds. One is the identification of procedural knowledge, itself
a misnomer, with the colloquial understanding of motor skill.
The second is the identification of declarative knowledge with
knowledge in the traditional sense.
Obviously, we do not hold the view that expertise at an activ-
ity requires explicit knowledge of first principles. Nevertheless,
we reject the view that skill and knowledge are independent. In
our view, skilled action is action guided by ongoing accrual and
improving application of knowledge of facts about an activity,
though skill is not exhausted by such knowledge.We will make the
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case that the use of the term “procedural knowledge” has misled
because the term has been applied to those aspects of skilled per-
formance that are arguably not based on knowledge. The intuitive
appeal of the dichotomy between the practical and the theoretical
is precisely because those aspects of motor tasks that have been
called procedural may indeed not require knowledge of facts. But
it does not follow from this that skills do not require knowledge of
facts. In our view, an attribute of a component has been made to
apply to the whole. Conversely, intellectual abilities likely ride on
many implicit abilities that are not considered along with more
obvious explicit processes (van Gaal et al., 2012).
We begin with a discussion of the pre-theoretic notion of
skill, that is, the functional category that scientific accounts of
skill should at the very least approximate. We argue that the
actions most naturally thought of as manifestations of skill quite
clearly are guided by knowledge of facts about that activity; we
use as an example, knowledge of what to do to initiate an action.
Of course, some manifestations of this knowledge are by agents
who cannot verbally articulate its content. We also argue that
this does not undermine its status as knowledge. Not only is the
notion of “verbal articulation” that underlies declarative knowl-
edge unclear, but there is no reason to make verbal articulation
in any sense necessary for knowledge. We then turn to the case of
HM (Milner, 1962). We argue that HM is not capable of acquir-
ing motor skills. Just as it is a mistake to identify declarative
knowledge with knowledge, it is a mistake to identify procedu-
ral knowledge with skill. Finally, we turn to other possible ways
of grounding a distinction between skilled performance and the-
oretical activity on the findings of neuroscience, and argue that
here too there is no hope of success. Cognitive neuroscience
simply does not provide a basis for a distinction between the
theoretical activities and practical ones, and deeper reflection on
the matter in fact suggests that there is no such distinction to
be drawn.
MOTOR SKILL, PERCEPTUAL DISCRIMINATION AND
INTENTION
What is the functional category that a theory ofmotor skill should
explain? Let us begin with some cases. Consider the distinction
between writing with your dominant hand, and writing with
your non-dominant hand, and the distinction between throwing
a baseball with your dominant hand and throwing a baseball with
your non-dominant hand. Most of us are skilled in the former
tasks, and unskilled with the latter ones. We are accustomed, by
virtue of long training and experience, to write and throw base-
balls with our dominant hands. We have no such training and
experience with our non-dominant hands. To describe someone
as “skilled” at an activity is to at least suggest that they have pro-
gressed far past baseline, or at least some contextually set point.
But to describe someone has “having skill” at an activity does not
bring with it the thorny issue of how far one must progress past
baseline relative to such a contextually set standard. It is natural
to assume that one necessary condition to have skill at ϕ-ing is to
have trained to be better than baseline at ϕ-ing.
Having skill at returning a serve in tennis, pitching, swim-
ming, and playing the piano are all ways in which one have a skill,
whereby skill can be considered the practice-related improvement
in a goal-directed action. Goal directed actions can be thought of
as skilled both when the subject is better at accomplishing a task
for rewards or points, and when their movements are deemed
smooth, graceful and efficient. These are two different things—
a gracefully hit shot can go out. A useful way about navigating
the idea of motor skill is to compare and contrast it with percep-
tual abilities (sometimes misleadingly called “perceptual skills”),
which can also improve with training, for example, discrimina-
tion for line orientation in peripheral vision (Watanabe et al.,
2001). How is being better at discriminating line orientation dif-
ferent from returning a serve in tennis or pitching a curve ball in
baseball? There are (at least) two differences.
First, though one can become better than baseline at dis-
criminating the orientation of lines, the basic ability to perceive
orientation does not require instruction nor does it need to be
learned. In contrast, even the basic ability to return a serve in ten-
nis or to pitch a curve ball in baseball must be instructed at least
initially, or in some other way experientially learned, and further
learning, either via instruction or observation, is required in order
for training to proceed. That is to say, improvement is predicated
on learning facts about the activity. This is a distinction between
the two kinds of cases. Facial recognition, for example, falls on the
perceptual learning side, and bicycle riding, for example, falls on
throwing a curve ball side.
Here is a second distinction between the two kinds of cases,
one that emerges quite clearly in one of Aristotle’s discussion of
the distinction between craft (skill) and virtue (Aristotle, 1999):
. . . in a craft, someone who makes errors voluntarily is more
choiceworthy; but with prudence, as with the virtues, the reverse
is true.
Aristotle’s point is that is a mark of being skilled at an action is
that one can make voluntary errors (and this distinguishes skill
from virtue). As Aristotle writes in the Metaphysics [1046b]:
[1] it is clear that some of the potencies (dunameis) also will be
irrational and some rational. Hence all arts, i.e., the productive
sciences, are potencies; because they are principles of change in
another thing, or in the artist himself qua other.
Every rational potency admits equally of contrary results, but
irrational potencies admit of one result only. E.g., heat can only
produce heat, but medical science can produce disease and health.
The reason of this is that science is a rational account, and the same
account explains both the thing and its privation, though not in
the same way; and in one sense it applies to both, and in another
sense rather to the actual fact. Therefore such sciences must treat
of contraries—essentially of the one, and non-essentially of the
other; for the rational account also applies essentially to the one,
but to the other in a kind of accidental way, since it is by negation
and removal that it throws light on the contrary. For the contrary
is the primary privation, and this is the removal of that to which
it is contrary. And since contrary attributes cannot be induced in
the same subject, and science is a potency which depends upon the
possession of a rational formula, and the soul contains a principle
of motion, it follows that whereas “the salutary” can only produce
health, and “the calefactory” only heat, and “the frigorific” only
cold, [20] the scientific man can produce both contrary results.
For the rational account includes both, though not in the same
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way; and it is in the soul, which contains a principle of motion,
and will therefore, by means of the same principle, set both pro-
cesses in motion, by linking them with the same rational account.
Hence things which have a rational potency produce results con-
trary to those things whose potency is irrational; for the results of
the former are included under one principle, the rational account.
Aristotle’s point here is that our skilled actions are always under
our rational control; a point that may have been lost to those of
us now who appeal or seek to analyze the notion of skill in phi-
losophy, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, but it
is front and center in Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. As he writes
(Ryle, 1949, p. 33), “The cleverness of the clownmay be exhibited
in his tripping and tumbling. He trips and tumbles just as clumsy
people do, except that he trips and tumbles on purpose and after
much rehearsal and at the goldenmoment and where the children
can see him and so as not to hurt himself.”
It is natural to explain this otherwise puzzling feature of skill
by appeal to the fact that manifestations of skill possession are
(typically? invariably?) intentional actions. My playing the piano
is a manifestation of my having skill at piano playing and the
playing itself is an intentional action. It is an act about which,
in Anscombe’s famous characterization (Anscombe, 1963, p. 9),
“a certain sense of the question ‘why’ is given application; the
sense of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a rea-
son for acting.” Something is an intentional action, if it makes
sense to ask the agent why he did it. The manifestations of what
we would colloquially describe as skills are paradigm examples of
intentional action, and are hence under our rational control. Take,
for example, archery. An agent who has skill at archery manifests
her skill by deciding to pick up a bow. That is, whether or not to
manifest her skill is under her rational control. Carlotta Pavese’s
work (in particular her forthcoming paper, “Skills as Knowledge,”
Unpublished) emphasizes this feature of skill, and discussions
with her over the years have helped us to recognize its centrality
and importance.
Paradigmatically, skills manifest in intentional actions.
Conversely, paradigm cases of movements that are not inten-
tional actions are also quite clearly not manifestations of skill;
to give some of examples from Anscombe (1963, p.13), “the
peristaltic movement of the gut,” and withdrawal of a hand “in
a movement of involuntary recoil.” The direct manifestations
of perceptual ability are also not intentional actions. Rather
the manifestations of perceptual ability are belief states, the
formation of which is generally regarded as not being under
direct voluntary control (Williams, 1970). If a normally sighted
agent perceives a table in front of him under normal lighting
conditions, it’s typically not possible for him to avoid forming
the belief that there is a table in front of him. More generally, if
one has strong evidence that p, it is difficult to avoid forming the
belief that p.
As Bernard Williams (1970) notes, granting that belief is
not under direct voluntary control, belief is nevertheless under
indirect voluntary control. Perhaps I can voluntarily join com-
munities that doubt the sources of evidence I have, and after
long exposure, learn to reject such sources of evidence (such as
the deliverances of climate science). Nevertheless, there remains
a difference between capacities that directly and characteristically
manifest themselves in belief formation, such as perception, and
paradigm examples of skill. Whether or not to pick up a bow or a
baseball bat is up to us in a way that forming a belief is not up to
us, even though forming a belief may be indirectly up to us.
There are ways to argue that perceptual discrimination is not
in the end as distinct along these two dimensions as they appear
on the face of it to be. Having skill requires training past base-
line. As a consequence, one can retain the view that having skill at
discriminating line orientation requires learning. Even if the basic
ability to discriminate line orientation is innate, having skill at it
requires training past baseline, if not instruction. To address the
second dis-analogy, one could also try to fold certain exercises of
visual perception into the mold of intentional action. For exam-
ple, I can selectively attend to portions of visual field. The fact that
I can selectively attend could be used to argue that there is a kind
of intentional action even in apparently passive faculties. Once I
attend to the table, I cannot help but see it as brown, but it is up
to me to decide to attend to the table in the first place.
However, this defense of perceptual discrimination as a skill is
inadequate. First, selective attention is, like the methods Bernard
Williams (1970) discusses, only a kind of indirect voluntary con-
trol. I can “decide” to form beliefs only about marbles by selec-
tively attending only to marble-rich parts of my environment. But
this is akin to “deciding” to form beliefs that the climate is not
changing by attending Tea Party rallies. Secondly, there is ample
evidence that perceptual ability can be acquired and improved in
the absence of attention. For example, in a widely used motion-
coherence detection task, subjects improved their discrimination
abilities at a supra-awareness threshold version of the task having
trained on a sub-awareness version of the task (Watanabe et al.,
2001). If perceptual ability can be acquired and improved in the
absence of attention, then its acquisition and improvement can-
not be due to exercise the skill in (say) training, because one does
not in these cases exercise even indirect voluntary control.
In the case of virtually any activity ϕ, having skill at ϕ-
ing requires knowing what to do to initiate actions of ϕ-ing.
Such knowledge is propositional knowledge (Stanley, 2011a,
Chapter 2). Knowing what to do to initiate an action is clearly fac-
tual knowledge; it is the knowledge that activities x1 . . . xn could
initiate that action. It is a kind of factual knowledge required by
skill possession. Furthermore, in the case of almost any complex
skill, such as tennis, being skilled requires knowing to do to initi-
ate a wide variety of actions. In other words, being skilled at an
activity requires possession of a large amount of propositional
knowledge about that activity.
Here is another way to see the point that being skilled at ϕ-ing
requires propositional knowledge about the activity of ϕ-ing. In
order to be skilled at ϕ-ing onemust know how to ϕ. For example,
being skilled at swimming requires know how to swim. Starting
with Ryle (1949), there is an extensive 20th century tradition
denying that knowing how to do something is factual (proposi-
tional) knowledge. That tradition has come under serious attack
in recent years (Stanley and Williamson, 2001; Stanley, 2011b).
Knowing how to swing one’s racket seems to be the same kind
of state as knowing when to swing one’s racket, and knowing
where to position one’s racket. As Jennifer Nagel pointed out to
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us, knowing how to do something might stand in a task-subtask
relation to other knowledge required for skill, such as knowing
what to do to initiate the action (Personal Communication). One
should have a uniform account of knowing-wh (knowing where,
when, why, how, what, whether . . . ). The most promising such
account treats them all uniformly as factual knowledge. Knowing
what to do to initiate an action and knowing how to do something
are both kinds of factual knowledge, factual knowledge required
by skill possession.
The expression “knowing what to do to initiate an action of
ϕ-ing” contains what is known as an embedded question, the
question “what to do to initiate an action of ϕ-ing.” This kind
of construction is called “an infinitival question” (Bhatt, 2006,
Chapter 4). Infinitival questions can only in English occur embed-
ded inside factive verbs like “know” or “remember.” Infinitival
questions have an ambiguity that is due to two different read-
ings of the infinitive construction, “what to do.” As Stanley and
Williamson (2001, p. 424) write:
So infinitives appear to have at least two different kinds of read-
ings. On the first reading, they express deontic modality. In this
case, a use of “to F” expresses something like “ought to F.” On
the second reading, they express some kind of possibility. On this
reading, a use of “to F” has a meaning that is similar to “can F”.
These are the two readings that seem available for infinitives in
embedded questions.
The sense of “knowing what to do to initiate action” in which
it expresses a necessary condition on skill possession is the one
in which the infinitive has an ability like modal reading. For x
to have skill at archery, x must know what x could do to initiate
an act of shooting a bow, e.g., x must know some of the things
he could do to initiate an act of archery, such as (a requirement
x may satisfy by knowing that he could start shooting arrows by
fitting the arrow into the bow).
The claim that knowing what to do to initiate an action of
ϕ-ing is a necessary condition for having skill at ϕ-ing does not
entail that what to do to initiate an action is always the same. What
to do to initiate an action of sailing differs from situation to sit-
uation, depending on weather and the landscape. Having skill in
sailing is a state that requires having different knowledge states
on different occasions, since knowing what to do to initiate an
action at sailing will involve knowing one set of facts under stormy
weather conditions, and another set of facts under calm weather
conditions. As Carlotta Pavese has pointed out to us, x’s knowing
what to do to initiate ϕ-ing is having generic knowledge of the
form: for situations s, x knows what to do to initiate an action of
ϕ-ing in s (Pavese, Unpublished).
By “initiating an action” we do not mean starting a causal
chain that terminates in an event, as choosing to eat some food
is a voluntary action that starts a causal chain that terminates in
a sequence of bodily events (these can be considered reflexes).
Rather, we mean knowing what to do to begin an intentional
action. (As Anscombe points out, the “peristaltic movement of
the gut” is not action performed in the relevant sense by an agent,
but only by her body; Anscombe, 1963).
Virtually anything colloquially describable as a “skill,” such as
swimming, riding a bicycle, chess, basketball, and cooking, have
agents who clearly know what to do to initiate the actions that
manifest the skill. Part of having skill at throwing a curve ball is
having the knowledge that throwing a curveball requires picking
a baseball up (as well as knowing what to do with it when it is in
your hand). Part of having the skill of chess is having knowledge
about the starting moves of the game and its rules. In such cases,
it is clear that part of having the skill is having the knowledge of
what to do to initiate the action that manifests the skill. It should
be emphasized that even starting conditions are complex, as in the
sailing example above, and an expert will have a larger repertoire
of starting actions and will know better how to apply them.
The claim that skill involves knowing what to do and how to
do it explains Aristotle’s comment about the distinctive nature
of skill, which is that skills are under our voluntary control.
Someone who has skill at ϕ-ing knows what to do to initiate an
action of ϕ-ing; a skilled actor knows what she could do to start ϕ-
ing. For example, someone who has skill at archery knows that she
could start shooting arrows by fitting them into her bow. It is the
modality associated with the infinitive that explains the distinc-
tive nature of skill. If one can, in the relevant sense, start shooting
arrows by fitting them into one’s bow, and one knows that one
can do this, then shooting arrows by fitting them into one’s bow
is under one’s voluntary control. Thus, skill possession requires a
kind of knowledge, possession of which entails voluntary control
over one’s actions. It is this feature of skill that explains its dis-
tinctive nature, and explains the feature of skill, that a mark of its
exercise is the capacity to make voluntary errors, that is present in
all classical discussions of skill from Aristotle to Ryle.
Possession of skill requires having knowledge states, possession
of which yields modal knowledge that yields voluntary control
over one’s actions. What is the nature of this modality? One might
worry that this modality presupposes skill. That is, one might
worry that one knows that one could shoot an arrow by fitting
it into the bow only if one has the skill to fit an arrow into a bow,
one might therefore worry that an infinite regress of skills threat-
ens. There is no threat of regress. Any interesting skill involves
knowledge of what to do initiate activities, where possession of
this knowledge requires more basic skills. For example, some-
one with skill at tennis has skill at serving. But at some point,
all such knowledge will rest on knowledge of basic actions, such
as grasping an object or lifting one’s arm. These activities are not
skills; they are not acquired by or improved upon by training in
adult life. Their manifestation is nevertheless under our voluntary
control.
Of course, we are not saying that uncontroversial cases of skill
only require knowing what to do to initiate actions. Typically, the
process of becoming more skilled involves learning about mul-
tiple actions involved in success at the activity, in addition to
their initiation conditions. The same kind of knowledge that is
used to initiate an activity can also be injected at anytime in
the ongoing course of that activity. For example, a tennis player
changes her mind and switches from a groundstroke to a drop
shot based on the position of the opponent. Such cases of learn-
ing are also knowledge. Our claim now is that it is obvious to the
point of not requiring argument that having a skill requires some
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knowledge about the activity. The example of the knowledge we
use is the knowledge of what to do to initiate actions of that sort.
Surprisingly, as will emerge below, this very uncontroversial claim
is sufficient to refute basic presuppositions of neuroscience, such
as the view that skill is identical to procedural knowledge.
As far as perceptual ability is concerned, it is considerably less
clear that someone with well-trained abilities knows what to do
to initiate the action that manifests the ability. Perhaps one may
appeal to the element of agency involved in directing oneself to
a stimulus, which one may count as initiating an “intentional
action” of perceptual acuity. If one does think of perceptual dis-
crimination, e.g., the judgment that three lines are all aligned, as
an intentional action on this basis, then an able discriminator of
line orientation knows what to do to initiate actions of orientation
discrimination. However, the implausibility of this description is
clear. It is implausible to think of perceptual discrimination as a
kind of action at all, much less an intentional action. The fact that
capacities such as perceptual acuity do not characteristically man-
ifest themselves as intentional actions explains why it is incorrect
to think of such capacities as skills. We have used knowing what to
do to initiate the action as a feature of skill that explains the fact
that the manifestations of skill are intentional actions. It should
therefore be no surprise to discover that abilities possession of
which does not require voluntary control seem to be abilities the
exercise of which does not seem to require infinitival knowledge,
such as knowing what to do to initiate action, or knowing how
to do it.
The various improvements that occur with perceptual discrim-
ination of line orientation are not the acquisition and improve-
ment of a skill. It is only in an irrelevant sense that it is true that
the able line orientation discriminator knows what to do to ini-
tiate line orientation discrimination, and it is quite odd to say
that the able line orientation discriminator knows how to dis-
criminate lines. The operations of these faculties somehow reside
between Anscombe’s example of the peristaltic movement of the
gut (Anscombe, 1963) and the operations of genuine skills.
What about learned activities that colloquially clearly seem to
fall under the category of skill, yet seem perception-like rather
than motor in their deliverances? A clear case is wine tasting. We
have argued that skills are manifestations of intentional action
but prima-facie it may seem that a professional wine taster is
merely better at perceiving subtle variations in taste, rather than
engaged in activities that could be described as intentional. One
might therefore think that our view is incompatible with classify-
ing wine tasting as a skill (though certainly it is not a motor skill).
However, the prima facie description of wine tasting that leads to
this objection is flawed. Professional wine tasting (and even more
obviously radiology) involves active decision-making. It requires
deciding between relevant factors in making an overall judgment.
A professional wine taster can certainly make intentional errors
in the course of delivering her judgment. Since this sort of active
decision-making is paradigmatically intentional, classifying wine
tasting as a skill is consistent with the view we are taking here on
the general nature of skill.
In philosophical discussions of skill dating back to the
ancients, it has been characterized as a capacity that one possesses
only if one can make voluntary errors. This is a feature that is
well explained by the view that skills directly manifest in inten-
tional actions.We have argued that the paradigm, uncontroversial
cases of skill are like this, and in all such cases, it is also clear that
knowledge about an activity is required in order to possess even a
minimal level of skill. Kinds of perceptual acuity lack important
features that we ascribe to skills; in particular knowing what to do
to initiate the action. We have also argued that the feature of skill
to which Aristotle draws our attention is explained by the hypoth-
esis that knowing what to do to initiate the action is required for
even a minimal level of skill.
However, we now face a worry. Not all agents who possess such
skills are able to verbally articulate their knowledge of what to do
to initiate an action. Is this an objection to our thesis that any
uncontroversial case of skill requires knowing facts about that
activity? What is the connection between knowing something and
being able to verbally articulate its content?
PROPOSITIONAL vs. DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE
It is well known that many experts at any activity are not the best
at explaining facts about the activity. If Socrates were correct in
the Gorgias that expertise requires the ability to explain to oth-
ers the first principles of a craft, then many people we regard as
experts would merely have a habit and not a skill (Plato, 1998).
Does our second necessary condition on having skill at ϕ-ing,
where ϕ-ing is a skill in the sense of paradigmatic examples like
playing the piano and playing chess, that it requires knowledge of
what to do to initiate action of ϕ-ing, commit us to the conse-
quence that someone who has skill at ϕ-ing can explain how to
ϕ, or at the very least explain what to do to initiate an action of
ϕ-ing?
Fodor (1968, p. 70) formulates this precise objection in his dis-
cussion of the “intellectualist” view attacked by Ryle (1949), that
knowing how to do something is a kind of knowing that:
There is, for example, the distinction between what we know how
to do and what we know how to explain. The cases that come
to mind here are skills, and the relevant gossip is that the best
practitioner need not be the best teacher.
The intellectualist holds that at least part of skill is propositional
knowledge. In fact, some intellectualists, such as Carlotta Pavese
(forthcoming) argue that all skill is knowledge. Do views such as
ours, according to which a large part of skill is knowledge, and
views such as Pavese’s, according to which all of skill is knowledge,
entail that the knowledge in question is verbalizable?
As Fodor explains, possession of knowledge does not entail
that the skilled agent needs to be able to explain that knowledge:
There is a real and important distinction between knowing how
to do a thing and knowing how to explain how to do that thing.
But that distinction is one that the intellectualist is perfectly able
to honor. Dogs, cats, and preverbal children know how to do all
sorts of things they can’t explain how to do; the ability to give
explanations is itself a skill – a special kind of knowing how, which
presupposes general verbal facility at the very least. But what has
this to do with the relation between knowing how and knowing
that? And what is there here to distress an intellectualist? (Fodor,
1968, p. 71) (Stanley (2011a) shows how a propositional view of
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knowing how invalidates the inference from “x knows how to F”
to “x knows how to explain how to F.”)
Fodor’s point is that having propositional knowledge is not
connected with the ability to articulate one’s propositional
knowledge.
Cognitive neuroscientists postulate a category they call
“declarative knowledge,” which is often represented as coinciding
with the notion of propositional knowledge in (say) epistemol-
ogy. It is a requirement on declarative knowledge that it is verbally
articulable. However, it is not clear what is meant by “articulable.”
Stanley (2011a, pp. 157–163) argues that the claim that all propo-
sitional knowledge is articulable is straightforwardly false, or that
the requirement of being capable of verbal articulation can be so
easily met to do the work cognitive neuroscientists think it does.
It is worthwhile rehearsing the argument.
Stanley (2011a, p. 161) considers an expert yet punch drunk
boxer, who is skilled at fighting a southpaw, but cannot give an
informative description of how he does it. Nevertheless, the boxer
can articulate his knowledge; by swinging his fists while facing
a southpaw, he can say “this is how you fight a southpaw.” If ver-
bal articulation excludes descriptions containing words like “this,”
then it is easy to show that not all propositional knowledge is
capable of verbal articulation. Looking at an edge of a mysterious
object, most of which is hidden from view, I can come to know
that this object is partially hidden from view (thanks to Carlotta
Pavese for this example). But since I don’t know the nature of
the object, this is propositional knowledge that cannot be ver-
bally articulated without using words like “this” and “that.” So if
“capable of verbal articulation” excludes verbal articulation with
demonstratives like “this” or “that,” then it is clear that not all
propositional knowledge is capable of verbal articulation. But if
sentences containing words like “this” and “that” are allowed to
be examples of successful verbal articulation, then stock examples
of cases in which one’s procedural knowledge is not supposed to
be capable of verbal articulation fail to be examples of this sort. It’s
simply not clear what is meant by the notion of verbal articulation
that underlies talk of declarative knowledge.
Even supposing declarative knowledge to be a well-defined
notion, it just is not a well-motivated requirement on knowl-
edge of facts. Humans are among the few species with a linguistic
capacity. Our linguistic capacity gives us vast resources. It gives
not only the ability to communicate complex messages to one
another, but also allows us to access concepts that would other-
wise be inaccessible without this ability. But there is simply no
reason to conclude that concept possession generally requires the
capacity to linguistically articulate. There is no reason to deny
that at least some animals without a capacity to verbally articu-
late their content nevertheless possess the same concepts we do.
The capacity to have attitudes to propositions generally does not
depend on the capacity for verbal articulation.
Why have so many philosophers and scientists wrongly
thought that knowing a fact requires the ability to verbally articu-
late it? This is because some examples of knowledge do seem to be
ones that characteristically manifest themselves in verbalization.
But to take this as a requirement on factual knowledge generally is
to mistake a property of some instances of a type with an essential
property of the type. As Wittgenstein so elegantly characterizes
the error in the Philosophical Investigations (1953):
78. Compare ‘knowing’ and ‘saying’:
How many feet high Mont Blanc is –
How the word ‘game’ is used –
How a clarinet sounds
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be
able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first.
Certainly not of one like the third.
There is also no compelling reason that has emerged in the the-
ory of knowledge over the centuries to think that the capacity to
entertain the attitude of knowledge towards a proposition requires
verbal articulation. According to internalism about knowledge, it
is a requirement for an agent to know that p that agent’s reasons
for believing that p are accessible to her. Internalism about knowl-
edge is a controversial doctrine; externalists hold that one can
know that pwithout remembering one’s reasons for believing that
p. For example, to take a famous example from Alvin Goldman,
many people know that Lincoln was President during the Civil
War without remembering where they learned it. Nevertheless,
even internalists about knowledge do not explain the accessibil-
ity of reasons in terms of the capacity to verbally articulate those
reasons. If even the most intellectualist view in epistemology does
not require what is accessible to the agent to be verbally articula-
ble, it is difficult to see how one could begin to motivate the view
that knowledge of facts requires an agent to have the capacity to
verbally articulate those facts.
Robert Stalnaker (2012, p. 755) writes:
In some cases, knowledge may be manifested in the assertion and
defense of what one knows, but in general, propositional knowl-
edge is the possession of information and the capacity of to use
that information to guide one’s actions. The action of asserting
what one knows is just one special case of an action that manifests
one’s cognitive capacity.
We have argued that there is no persuasive reason from the philo-
sophical literature on knowledge to take verbal articulation of
its content to be a condition on knowledge. To make this point,
one does not need to adopt a positive account of the nature of
knowledge. Nevertheless, we find much wisdom in Stalnaker’s
remark.
On the hypothesis that one should not give necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for anything, we have not attempted to do so
either for skill or knowledge. Instead, we have made two claims
about having skill at ϕ-ing, only the first of which we are com-
mitted to holding universally (i.e., across all skills). The first is
that having skill at ϕ-ing requires being trained past baseline. The
second is that there is a large class of skills, the ones the manifes-
tations of which are intentional actions, such that having skill at
ϕ-ing requires knowing what to do to initiate an act of ϕ-ing, or
more colloquially, how to start ϕ-ing (knowledge that may be dif-
ferent in different circumstances). In this section we have argued
that the fact that some agents (and perhaps animals too) can-
not verbally articulate this knowledge is no obstacle to its status
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as knowledge. Declarative knowledge may not even be a well-
defined notion, and even if it were, in its broadest sense, it does
not capture knowledge of facts.
We now turn to the case of HM, andmore generally, the notion
of procedural knowledge.
THE LESSONS OF HM: MOTOR ACUITY, ACTION SELECTION
AND KNOWLEDGE
The case of HM is seminal for field of cognitive neuroscience,
specifically the idea that there are multiple memory systems in
the brain (Cohen and Squire, 1980). HM was a patient with
intractable epilepsy who underwent bilateral temporal lobectomy
and was subsequently found to have persistent and pervasive
anterograde amnesia—he would rapidly forget events soon after
they occurred. In a groundbreaking experiment, the psychologist
Brenda Milner had HM perform a mirror drawing task in which
he had to trace the outline of star with a pencil through a mir-
ror with vision of his own arm obscured (Milner, 1962). HM
showed improvement over 3 days on this task even though on
each day he had no explicit memory for ever having encountered
the task before nor even a feeling of familiarity with it. This is an
admittedly fascinating and important result. However, it has also
done great harm. It is partly responsible for the overly simplis-
tic mapping between the declarative/procedural distinction and
other distinctions such as that between knowledge and skill, or
between theoretical and practical capacities. As we argue here
the case of HM, and patients like HM, simply does not support
drawing such distinctions.
Here is a fact about HM. Each time HM performed the task he
received explicit verbal instruction, and was able to use that knowl-
edge each time. HM of course forgot that he had used explicit
knowledge. But that of course does not entail he did not require
the knowledge at the time. To understand what the original results
do or do not mean, it is useful to consider more recent experi-
ments conducted in patients with similar medial temporal lobe
lesions to HM since the 1960s. The general approach in follow-
up studies in patients with medial temporal lobe lesions, as in
the original Milner experiment, is to demonstrate dissociation
between improvement in motor performance variables, usually
time to completion and error/accuracy measures, and ability to
explicitly recall aspects of the task. What becomes apparent when
considering this literature is that the amnestic patients could
not perform any of the tasks unless instruction was provided on
each day.
For example, Shumita Roy and Norman Park introduced
amnesic patients to novel tools the function of which could only
be known by being told; they could not be solved through simple
affordance or mechanical problem solving (Roy and Park, 2010).
Critically although the patients did improve on motor perfor-
mance variables across days, this only happened in the context
of explicit instructions about the tool and how to use it every day.
If the motor skill is considered the combination of knowing what
to do along with doing it better then the idea that the motor skill
in toto is procedural knowledge is doubly misleading. It is mis-
leading because it is obvious that the patients need instruction to
even get started at the activity. Surely, someone who has skill at an
activity does not require such instruction. A tennis match would
not proceed very well if the player needed a continuous stream of
instructions as to what a tennis racket is, what a backhand is, what
a ball toss is, what the point of the game is etc.
It is also misleading because the component of novel tool use
that is being learned across days in these patients is not knowledge
at all. Instead, it is a kind of learning directly analogous to per-
ceptual learning. Shmuelof and colleagues have recently coined
the term “motor acuity” to describe practice-related reductions
in movement variability and increases in movement smoothness
(Shmuelof et al., 2012). They have also shown that healthy sub-
jects will adapt to perturbations like a mirror despite it being
contrary to their own intentions (Mazzoni and Krakauer, 2006).
Such adaptations are not the acquisition of something that char-
acteristically manifests in intentional action, i.e., they are not the
acquisition of skills. The point we have here been making is that
performing a skilledmotor action in any ordinary sense (where the
paradigm cases are activities like tennis, cooking, dancing) cen-
trally involves propositional knowledge. Another critical point is
that if healthy subjects were to continue practicing with the Park
and Roy tools, some might adopt better strategies than others—
for example explicitly noticing that if they adopt a particular
posture and arm configuration that they use the tool better. This
is explicit knowledge that could either be coached or acquired
just through looking and playing with the tools over time. This
knowledge would combine with acuity for more skilled perfor-
mance overall. In this way healthy subjects would outperform the
patients over time because they can accumulate knowledge about
the task and select more optimal actions even if they are matched
in terms of ability to improve acuity of any given action.
It is clear from the literature in cognitive neuroscience that in
the rush to ground an apparently significant theoretical distinc-
tion in the brain, such as the distinction between knowledge and
skill, or the theoretical and the practical, the point that motor
skill requires knowledge has been largely missed (but see Bruner,
1973; Willingham, 1998). Motor skills have been incorrectly iden-
tified with the part of skill that is not knowledge. As Roy and Park
(2010) write, in the very same paper that raises serious problems
for the identification of motor skill with procedural knowledge
“It has been proposed that some aspects of tool-related knowl-
edge (e.g., tool attributes) may rely on the declarative memory
system, while other aspects of tool knowledge (e.g., motor skills)
appear to be represented in the procedural memory system.” Roy
and Park then argue that so-called “tool knowledge” is not motor
skill, because it involves both declarative and procedural aspects.
But this is a bizarre conclusion to draw and coming to it again
indicates the tendency to want to exclude a declarative compo-
nent from motor skill. Obviously, tool knowledge is a paradigm
example of motor skill; tool use is for example Heidegger’s central
example of amotor skill. The correct conclusion to draw fromRoy
and Park (2010) is rather that motor skill involves both a knowl-
edge component and a component that is not knowledge-based,
namely the so-called procedural aspect.
One might think that one can still use these facts from cog-
nitive neuroscience to ground colloquial or folk distinctions
between knowledge and skills, or the theoretical and the practical.
For example, one might maintain that manifesting skills involves
both a knowledge component and a “procedural” component,
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whereas manifesting knowledge does not. However, this is not
correct. One can make this point very simply. All sorts of cogni-
tive processes that do not involve knowledge are implicated in the
manifestation of knowledge. For example, the acquisition of per-
ceptual knowledge requires perceptual ability. Perceptual ability
is not a kind of knowledge. It follows that manifesting perceptual
knowledge, say by telling someone the color of a desk, requires
perceptual acuity. Nevertheless, telling someone the color of a
desk is clearly the manifestation of knowledge of facts (Stanley,
2011a, pp. 171–172).
The point also holds for the manifestation of quintessential
cognitive skills like chess, which also improves with practice.
A chess player makes explicit decisions based on explicit knowl-
edge of the rules and of previous games, but there is considerable
evidence that higher-level cognitive processes can be influenced
by unconscious information processing (van Gaal et al., 2012).
Similarly, the mathematician makes explicit decisions based on
explicit knowledge of rules. But the manifestation of this knowl-
edge involves much implicit processing of which she is unaware.
The moral of the foregoing is that there is in fact no difference
between practical and theoretical tasks with respect to the kind
of knowledge. Motor skill tasks have an acuity component that is
directly analogous to perceptual acuity. But neural computations
equivalent to those underlying both perceptual and motor acu-
ity are no doubt implicated in many theoretical pursuits as well.
One might perhaps attempt to ground an interesting distinction
between theory and practice, or between theoretical knowledge
and skill, by appeal to different kinds of content in the relevant
knowledge states. However, this is a hopeless task. The knowledge
involved in having skill at tennis is different than the knowledge
involved in being a math professor. But for all we know the con-
tent of the knowledge involved in being a French professor is more
similar to the content of the knowledge involved in having skill
in tennis than it is to the knowledge involved in being a math
professor.
Manifesting skill is more than just adaptation or improved
motor acuity. It involves a large amount of propositional knowl-
edge about the relevant activity. It is also quite plausible that in the
typical case manifesting propositional knowledge also involves
perceptual andmotor components. There is a distinction between
perceptual and motor ability, on the one hand, and knowledge,
on the other hand (though possession of the latter in many cases
requires the possession of the former). But it is simply hopeless
to ground any interesting philosophical distinction between skill
and something else on the distinction between perceptual and
motor acuity, on the one hand, and propositional knowledge, on
the other. Manifesting any kind of knowledge, and any kind of
skill, requires possession of both.
We have not delineated in this article exactly how propositional
knowledge leads to selection of the optimal actions for a particu-
lar task. Coaching involves verbal instruction and demonstration
to convey a mean single action (e.g., a backhand) or sequence
of actions (e.g., weaving) to perform the task. Our core claim is
that real world motor skills require the employment of the correct
average action, presumably selected from a large potential reper-
toire through external instruction or self-instruction based on
ever-accumulating knowledge of the task, followed by increased
precision of the selected action through practice (motor acuity).
Thus sport and other activities that are generally considered
skilled require knowledge as a scaffold for subsequent develop-
ment of acuity of the selected action components. We should also
emphasize that use of knowledge to select actions continues in
the skilled state because there is always the possibility to perform
new actions based on further knowledge and then develop acuity
at these new actions (the Fosbury flop in high jump would be an
example of this). In addition, the ability to select the right action
from a repertoire based on context also improves with experience
and knowledge. This is congruent with the observation that ath-
letes are not paying less attention than novices when they play and
are more aware of errors.
Does the fact that manifesting skill requires knowledge pre-
clude non-human animals from possessing skills? We are agnostic
as to whether animals can be skilled. It is possible that as a task is
weighted increasingly toward rules, alternative actions, and on-
the-fly problem solving, then simple operant conditioning may
not suffice to accomplish the task. In this sense non-human ani-
mals may be limited in a way similar to the amnestic patients in
the Roy and Park experiment. Although non-human animals may
exhibit the same behavior as humans, this does not entail that
the explanation for the behavior is the same. It could be that the
explanation skilled action in humans involves intellectual capaci-
ties lacking in non-human animals. As Ryle (1949, pp. 128–129)
writes:
To say that John Doe can swim differs from saying from saying
of a puppy that it can swim. For to say that the puppy can swim
is compatible with saying that it has never been taught to swim,
or had practice in swimming, whereas to say that a person can
swim implies that he has learned to swim and has not forgotten.
The capacity to acquire capacities by being taught is not indeed
a human peculiarity. The puppy can be taught or drilled to beg,
much as infants are taught to walk and use spoons. But some kinds
of learning, including the way in whichmost people learn to swim,
involve the understanding and application of spoken instructions
or at least of staged demonstrations; and a creature that can learn
things in these ways is unhesitatingly conceded to have a mind,
where the teachability of the dog and infant leaves us hesitant
whether or not to say that they yet qualify for this certificate.
Alternatively, it could be that animals can both possess concepts
and bear the knowledge relation to propositions (if so, one would
need to explain why animals cannot acquire certain skills that
humans can; perhaps because there complex skills require com-
plex concepts, which cannot be grasped by animals). Obviously,
deciding between these options is beyond the scope of this paper.
So what, then, are motor skills? We have not taken a final
position here. Our point has been rather to argue that man-
ifesting one’s skill at an activity requires a large amount of
ever-accumulating propositional knowledge about that activity.
This point is consistent with those views of the nature of skill
that assigns a central role to knowledge of facts. For example,
Carlotta Pavese argues that skills are knowledge states (Pavese,
Unpublished). Peter Railton argues that skills are belief states
(Railton, forthcoming). Stanley (2011a, pp. 181–184) suggests
two distinct accounts of skill, neither of which identifies skills
with cognitive states, yet nevertheless accords a central guiding
role to such states. According to the first, having a skill is having
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a state that yields the “fluid acquisition of reasons for acting in
novel situations,” where reasons for acting are knowledge states
(see Stanley and Williamson (forthcoming) for development of
this view). According to the second, as delineated by us here,
skills are composite states, requiring both increasing knowledge of
required actions, and practice-related improvement in the selec-
tion and acuity of these actions. All of these views of skill accord
knowledge a central role, and as a result are each consistent with
the central moral of our paper.
CONCLUSIONS
Hubert Dreyfus’s work on skill, which is influenced by
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, has been deeply influential in phi-
losophy and the social sciences. Dreyfus has posited what he
calls a “five stage model of skill acquisition,” from novice to
expert (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1980). According to Dreyfus, as one
becomes more proficient, one’s actions move from being guided
by decisions based on knowledge to being rather more like per-
ceptual states. As he writes (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986, p. 371),
“Action becomes easier and less stressful as the learner simply sees
what needs to be achieved rather than deciding . . . ” The merely
proficient actor falls short of expertise, precisely because “after
seeing the goal and the important features of the situation, must
still decide what to do. To decide, he falls back on detached rule
following.” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986) The difference between
the merely proficient performer and the expert precisely is that
the expert no longer needs to make decisions about what to do
based on her knowledge about the activity.
The proficient performer, immersed in the world of his skillful
activity, sees what needs to be done, but decides how to do it. The
expert not only sees what needs to be achieved: thanks to a vast
repertoire of situational discriminations he sees how to achieve his
goal.
On Dreyfus’s view, expert performance is a species of perceptual
acuity. It does not involve the elements of agency that result from
knowledge. We have argued that this is a deeply flawed model
of skill possession. It suggests, for example, that an expert ten-
nis player stands to tennis as HM stands to mirror drawing. As
we have seen, patients like HM cannot acquire skills with novel
tools, precisely because they cannot retain or accumulate the rel-
evant knowledge to guide them. A view of expertise that makes
it analogous to motor adaptation of the sort that occurs in the
mirror-drawing task on cannot be correct because it leaves out the
knowledge component that is required in order for adaptation or
acuity to manifest.
Although we have not addressed the topic in depth here,
another position taken by Dreyfus is that true expertise is some-
how automatic or habitual, and knowledge is no longer required.
While it is indeed true that certain motor activities can become
habitual or automatic over time, we would again argue that is
exactly what does not happen when a motor skill such as tennis
or piano is being enacted. In fact the opposite is the case—the
musician or athlete is using knowledge of the musical score or the
game to dictate to those automatic non-knowledge based compo-
nents; it is the combination that leads to the skilled performance.
Even if it were the case that the need to use knowledge as scaf-
folding for building certain non-knowledge components dimin-
ishes over time once these components are built, this does not
imply that new knowledge is not needed to continue acquiring
greater skill and add new non-knowledge components. In effect,
a continuing symbiosis or bootstrapping between knowledge and
non-knowledge is what we propose leads to greater skill overall.
The wide interdisciplinary acceptance of the view that exper-
tise and knowledge are disconnected has caused us to lose our
grip on one of the central topics in the history of Western
Philosophy. The tendrils of the rich philosophical discussion of
skill (techne) in Plato and Aristotle are now only recognizable
in our intuitive reactions. It remains, for example, considerably
more natural to describe someone as skilled at speaking French
than at understanding French. The incorrect identification among
neuroscientists of motor skill in its entirety with some of its
implicit components has significantly contributed to the problem.
We hope to have repaired the damage, by showing that, properly
understood, the central discoveries in neuroscience about motor
skill lend no support whatsoever to the view that skilled motor
activity is not the manifestation of knowledge.
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